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ABSTRACT 
 
The theory underpinning financial liberalization postulates that unregulated financial 
markets are growth augmenting.  Guyana has been a model reformer since 1988 
implementing market friendly policies.  Growth performance, however, has been 
subdued.  This paper argues that natural entry barriers necessitate an oligopolistic 
banking structure, which follows a mark-up threshold loan interest rate rule at which 
business credit is constrained.  Empirical validation of the mark-up loan rate comes from 
a bank excess liquidity preference curve that is horizontal at the high threshold rate. 
Moreover, the flat curve signifies that non-remunerated excess liquidity and interest 
paying business loans are perfect substitutes at the threshold loan rate.  Once business 
credit is restricted, banks hold excess liquidity and/or foreign assets.  Therefore, the 
Guyanese economy has evolved from a regime of government financial repression to 
private oligopoly bank stagnation; hence the missing link connecting finance and growth.             
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*This paper is a revised version of the one presented at the 39th Annual Caribbean 
Monetary Studies Conference, Belize, November 2007.  I am grateful to two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.  However, errors which 
might remain are my responsibility.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Several international analysts have sought to explain the factors behind the 
dramatic decline in the rate of growth of the Guyanese economy after a brief period of 
expansion from 1991 to 1997.  For instance, Weisman (2003) found adverse terms of 
trade, large government deficits and burdensome external debt to be important 
determinants of the poor growth performance.  Interestingly the study found total factor 
productivity growth for the post-reform era to be -5.5 percent, -1 percent for the planned 
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economy period, and 2.9% for the early years after political independence from Great 
Britain (Weisman 2003, p. 123).     
Another article by Staritz, Atoyan and Gold (2007) attributes the growth 
stagnation to low rates of private investment (an obvious factor), negligible inflows of 
foreign investment, and political instability and crimes.  Using a comparative historical 
analysis with Barbados as the counterfactual, DaCosta (2007) argues that Guyana’s 
mediocre economic performance could be due to adverse geography and poor colonial 
legacy institutions. The latter tends to exacerbate political rivalry between Guyanese of 
Indian and African ancestry.        
The studies cited above have omitted the key issue of finance and economic 
growth.  This paper takes up this matter by analyzing the growth implications of financial 
liberalization (hereafter FL) in light of the fact that Guyana has been an active reformer 
of financial and non-financial policies.  The paper argues that the size of the real 
economy presents a natural barrier to the existence of deep financial markets; thus the 
financial system is dominated by oligopolistic commercial banks that possess the ability 
to mark up the loan rate over the marginal cost of production and a risk-free foreign 
interest rate1.  Therefore, in an era of interest rate deregulation and bank privatization, 
commercial banks are in a position to set high interest rates that can be above an 
equilibrium natural rate that clears desired savings and investment decisions (a la a 
loanable funds model).  In this situation investment demand is constrained by high 
lending rates.  The Guyanese economy has therefore evolved from a period of 
government-induced financial repression to private oligopoly bank stagnation. 
                                                 
1 For a mathematical derivation of this relationship see Klein (1971) and Khemraj (2010).  
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 The size of the economy constrains the market size within which the commercial 
banks operate; in other words, the size of the economy presents a natural entry barrier to 
the development of deep financial markets and competitive institutions.  Therefore, an 
oligopolistic banking sector is the natural outcome (Vives 2001).  However, one other 
viewpoint holds that an oligopolistic banking sector with a high concentration ratio does 
not imply an absence of competition since the sector could be highly contestable.  
Utilizing the industrial organization notion of contestability, Claessens and Laeven 
(2005) argue that competition resulting from contestability enhances financing to 
financially dependent firms.  Thus this form of competition could be growth-augmenting.  
In other words, Claessens and Laeven argue even though the banking sector could be 
highly concentrated, the threat of entry promotes competition, which is favourable for 
business financing.  An obvious policy implication is contestability could result from 
deregulation.   
  However, there are good reasons to believe that the Guyanese banking sector is 
not very contestable.  Firstly, the smallness of the economy acts as a natural barrier to 
entry.  There is space for only a few banks.  Incumbent banks, therefore, do not have to 
push the loan rate down to marginal cost.  This means capital account liberalization and 
deregulation have not elicited the entry of many more banks from abroad.  While there 
has been the entry of three foreign banks, these have focused – with the exception of one 
small foreign bank – on buying up existing banks assets.  Secondly, there is substantial 
start up and sunk costs associated with the entry of new banks.  Buildings, various 
technologies and branch networks (in a country where the population is geographically 
dispersed) must be put in place.  It is for this reason why entry of foreign banks has 
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largely been restricted to the purchase of existing institutions (brownfield investments) 
rather than establishing new entities (greenfield investments) and risk further fragmenting 
market share.  Foreign banks are eager to buy out existing market share rather than incur 
the new fixed costs associated with trying to win new market share.  If the fixed and sunk 
costs incurred today are not compensated by the discounted future stream of net incomes, 
many more banks are not likely to enter the sector.   
The Guyanese banking sector is made up of six commercial banks, all of which 
are privately owned.  At the end of 2006, the three largest commercial banks owned 90 
percent of total banking industry assets, while 67 percent of aggregate financial system 
(bank plus non-bank) assets are owned by commercial banks.  Three of the six 
commercial banks were foreign owned.                    
This paper, however, does not deny that there are other important determinants of 
economic growth such as physical and human capital accumulation and technology. 
Instead, the paper presents a case study, Guyana, to draw attention to an important 
omission in the literature that focuses on the finance-growth nexus.  The paper concludes 
by noting that the other determinants are best activated via an industrial policy 
framework.  In other words, finance is logically endogenous (and not endogenous in the 
Granger predictability sense) to an industrial policy framework.  The article takes the 
following structure. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on the finance-
growth nexus.  Section 4 outlines the de-regulation policies adopted by Guyana.  Section 
5 presents data to explain why the finance-growth relationship is broken.  Section 6 
presents a model which demonstrates the effect of FL on investment demand and 
ultimately economic growth.  Section 7 concludes.        
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2. THE THEORETICAL FINANCE-GROWTH NEXUS 
Prior to the mid-1980s, many developing countries, including Guyana, intervened 
heavily in their domestic financial systems to ensure the necessary finance was available 
for priority areas identified in their development plans. Fry (1982, 1995) documented the 
main interventions as nominal interest rate ceilings for deposit and loan rates, directed 
credit to particular industries, and the expropriation by government of seigniorage by the 
use of high cash and liquid asset requirements and obligatory holding of government 
securities. Such policies were inspired by the view that money and physical capital are 
substitutes, a viewpoint that emanated from the monetary growth models (Fry 1995, pp. 
15-17). Physical capital accumulation requires policies that would increase the rate of 
return on capital vis-à-vis money; hence, reducing the return on money induces economic 
agents to invest in physical capital, thereby augmenting the capital-labour ratio and per 
capita incomes (Ibid, p. 17).    
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) launched a serious challenge against the 
practice of government restrictions on the financial system – known as financial 
repression.  The McKinnon-Shaw FL thesis holds that financial repression engenders low 
saving and investment rates, low quality investments, and credit rationing. McKinnon 
(1973) in particular emphasized that investment expenditures are lumpier than 
consumption and that investors must first accumulate money balances before investing. 
The relative lumpiness of investment implies that aggregate demand for money will be 
positively related to physical capital, hence McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis.   
Shaw (1973) highlighted the importance of financial institutions in providing 
intermediation between savers and investors. Financial intermediaries are critical for 
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economic growth because they perform several important roles when they channel funds 
from savers to investors – they are able to use their expertise to efficiently allocate the 
higher quantity of investible funds among competing uses. In the absence of repression, 
financial institutions are able to offer savers higher rates of return and are able to make 
investments more efficiently by accommodating liquidity preferences, diversifying risks, 
reaping economies of scale, and lowering information costs (Fry 1995).   
Endogenous growth models are also used to demonstrate the case for FL, which 
enhances steady-state growth by altering the rate of technological innovation (Levine 
1997). According to Levine, endogenous growth models provide the analytical 
framework by which to model the positive effects of finance on productivity. The 
financial system augments productivity by performing functions like processing 
information in order to discern the best investment projects and thus optimal resource 
allocation; and also by providing a way for investors to diversify and hedge risks, thereby 
permitting investors to make riskier projects that have higher rates of return. To the 
extent financial intermediaries augment capital accumulation – which exerts a positive 
externality effect on society – they are likely to propel the economy to a higher steady-
state growth.  In addition, within the tradition of an endogenous growth model, 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) demonstrate that competitive intermediaries (banks) 
eliminate the need for agents to self-finance and hold unproductive liquid assets. 
Therefore, competitive financial intermediaries alter the composition of savings in favour 
of capital accumulation. To the extent capital accumulation has an externality effect, 
higher equilibrium growth rates will be observed in economies with banks versus 
economies in financial autarky.    
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However, this paper argues that the channels outlined above through which 
finance can positively augment growth are disrupted or broken when the banking sector 
is oligopolistic. The McKinnon-Shaw channel is impeded because higher savings via 
higher interest rate (a key policy recommendation of the FL school) does not mean the 
savings would be channelled to productive investments.  Moreover, the productivity 
enhancing channel of endogenous growth theory is impeded in an economy where the 
banking sector dominates the financial system; and where, furthermore, the banking 
sector does not invest in a manner consistent with economic development. In other 
words, excess liquidity and foreign assets cannot exert positive externality effects on 
growth.           
Other authors have emphasized the tendency for FL to precipitate financial crises, 
which retard economic growth.  For instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) have 
uncovered the tendency for financial liberalization to engender banking and balance of 
payments crises.  Sundaram (1998) argues it is FL rather than excessive regulation that 
precipitated the Malaysian currency crisis.  In addition, Grabel (1995) injected the ideas 
of adverse selection and credit rationing into a Post-Keynesian framework, which leads to 
an outcome of “speculative-led development” and crisis.  Moreover, under a liberalized 
regime low emphasis is placed on direct production-based policies.  In other words, the 
role of a developmental state engaging in industrial policy is discouraged (Pantin 1995).  
This point was also made by Chang, Park and Yoo (1998) who argued that the 
dismantling of industrial policy and regulations were accountable for the Korean 
financial crisis of 19972.   
 
                                                 
2 However, it should be noted Guyana did not experience a systemic financial crisis.   
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3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Figure 1 illustrates three main phases of economic history since Guyana’s 
independence form Great Britain in 1966. In the first phase, 1966 to 1975, real GDP 
expanded at an annual average rate of 3.9 percent (growth rates are annual averages). 
Three important events worth mentioning took place during this period. Firstly, there was 
the first oil price shock. Secondly, in 1970 economic policy shifted towards Socialist 
planning. The government nationalized all major production entities, including the 
bauxite and sugar industries in 1971 and 1973, respectively. Thirdly, in 1974 and 1975 
Guyana benefited from a major increase in world sugar price and as a result there were 
recorded growth rates of 7.7 and 8.4 percent, respectively. 
A protracted downturn in the level of real GDP occurred during the second period 
from 1976 to 1988.  Real GDP contracted by an average rate of -2.1 percent over the 
entire period.  State control intensified with the nationalization of foreign-owned banks; 
the implementation of an exchange control scheme in an effort to ration foreign 
exchange; and the imposition of price controls. An important development in the second 
period is the rise of the underground economy, which was estimated by Faal (2003) to be 
around 62.7 percent of official GDP. Faal’s estimates show a significant pick-up in 
underground activities over the period 1982 to 1988, during which time the estimated size 
was approximately 82.5 percent of the official economy. Thomas (1989), using different 
methods, also estimated the size of the unofficial sector during the period 1982 to 1986; 
his estimates vary between 22 to 99 percent of the official level of GDP.   
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Figure 1.  Real GDP growth (right axis) and the GDP level index (left axis; 1990 = 100), 
1966-2006 
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The underground economy over the period of protracted economic contraction 
was at its largest and may provide an explanation for the fall in the level of GDP as 
agents sought to circumvent the many restrictions imposed by government during that 
period.  However, over the period 1970 to 1975, which coincides with part of the first 
period, the average size was 38.4 percent of the official economy (Faal 2003).  During the 
period 1989 to 2000, which overlaps with part of the post-reform period, Faal estimates 
the size to be 51.6 percent; however, the estimate drops to 35.3 percent for the period 
1995 to 2000.  
By the end of 1988 the government launched the Economic Recovery 
Programmed (ERP) in an effort to address the significant downturn in aggregate 
production.  Consequently, a major scheme of economic liberalization commenced in 
early 1989.  A 2.5 percent economic growth – which was lower than the 3.9 percent pre-
reform average of the first phase – was recorded for the period 1989 to 2005.  However, 
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there are two important sub-periods: 1991 to 1997 and 1998 to 2006.  Over the first sub-
period, the average economic growth was 7.1 percent, while over the second sub-period 
growth plummeted to 0.1 percent.  However, not all growth over the post-1988 period 
can be explained by new economic enterprises; as explained above, the substantial 
decline in the underground economy over the 1990s meant many agents were willing to 
produce under the purview of the official economy, something that can be explained by 
the abandonment of many stifling government restrictions on businesses and households.   
4. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION POLICIES 
As explained earlier, the policy of financial liberalization is premised on the thesis 
that a competitive, deep and well functioning financial system will engender economic 
growth through the optimal allocation of the economy’s financial resources.  In order to 
harness the growth-augmenting potential of finance, the liberalization of the financial 
system was an important component of the post-1988 reform agenda.  Since the 
Guyanese financial system is dominated by the commercial banking sector, the reform 
measures had to pay considerable attention to this sub-sector.  Ganga (1998) placed the 
reform measures under three broad categories: (i) policies to improve the efficiency and 
competition in the financial sector; (ii) policies to strengthen the prudential framework 
and bank supervision; and (iii) policies to develop and deepen financial markets.  
The first category of policy comprised of dismantling of interest rate controls on 
deposits and loans, jettisoning of directed credit schemes to priority sectors, encouraging 
privatization of state-owned financial institutions, allowing the entry of foreign banks, 
adopting a flexible exchange rate regime by merging the black market exchange rate with 
the official rate, and using indirect instruments of monetary policy.  A major turning 
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point in monetary policy operations took place in June 1991 with the adoption of indirect 
instruments.  A competitive bidding system for Treasury bills was instituted, first on a 
monthly basis, then biweekly in June 1994, and finally weekly in February 1996 (Das and 
Ganga 1997; Egoume-Bossogo et al 2003).  Buyers, mainly institutional investors, bid 
for the instruments, which are usually sold to the lowest bidders, thus determining the 
rate of interest through the market.  Specifically, the rate of interest on 91-day Treasury 
bills is seen as the anchor rate of the banking system which determines the bank rate, the 
deposit rate, and the prime-lending rate (Bank of Guyana 2005, p. 44)3.  
Efforts were made, with respect to the external sector, to abolish the exchange 
control system and to establish a market-based system to determine the exchange rate.  In 
1990, both commercial banks and other non-bank dealers were licensed to trade foreign 
currencies in the cambio market.  For a brief period the cambios co-existed with the 
official market until when the two were merged in February 1991.  In 1993 the central 
bank instituted the inter-bank cambio market operations in order to facilitate the 
integration of the two markets.  The Exchange Control Act was abolished in 1995, thus 
removing the limit on the repatriation or inflow of foreign currencies.    
Reducing the role of the State in the financial sector was seen as necessary to 
enhance efficiency and competition.  As a result, government sold its shares in the two 
                                                 
3 However, if the commercial banks possess some influence over the determination of the Guyanese 
Treasury bill rate, the rate is not likely to be a good signal for the monetary policy stance of the central 
bank as it will not respond quickly to liquidity conditions.  Since the purchase of government securities is 
dominated by a few large institutional investors, namely commercial banks, it is expected that the banks 
would not take the government security rate as given, but rather they face an upward sloping supply curve.  
In such a case the classic theory of the banking firm – as outlined for instance by Klein (1971) and applied 
by Agenor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2004) – cannot be exactly replicated to Guyana with a non-
competitive government bond market.   
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largest commercial banks and the biggest state-owned bank was sold in 2003.  Steps were 
also taken to reform the payments system in order to automate the clearing of checks. 
The second category of policies included measures to strengthen prudential 
regulations and bank supervision.  In this regard, the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) was 
enacted in 1995.  The legislation gives the Bank of Guyana the right to license and 
supervise all financial institutions undertaking banking businesses.  Ganga (1998, p. 153) 
noted the “FIA also addresses issues of large exposures, limits investments in non-bank 
companies, liquidity ratio, minimum capital for setting up a bank, licensing of new banks, 
insider lending, prohibited operations, loan classification, and other regulations that 
would limit risk and concentration of ownership of financial institutions.”  In addition to 
the FIA, the Bank of Guyana Act, which seeks among other things to preserve the 
independence of the central bank, was enacted in 1998. 
The third category of policies was intended to facilitate the development and 
deepening of financial markets.  The first step towards the development of financial 
markets was to promote the money market.  Measures were put in place to facilitate the 
weekly auctioning of Treasury bills to manage liquidity conditions and a rediscounting 
policy was commissioned to encourage trading of the bills in order to enhance their 
liquidity.  However, the secondary market for these securities has remained inactive.  The 
central bank has also sought to encourage an interbank market by proposing the interbank 
transfer system. However, this market has not fully developed today because of the 
persistence of excess reserves; consequently, the overnight rate is powerless as a 
monetary policy instrument.   
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A main step towards the development of the capital markets occurred in 2003 
when the Guyana Association of Securities Companies and Intermediaries Inc., (GASCI) 
a self-regulating organization, was registered to operate the Guyana Stock Exchange.  Its 
members, the stockbrokers who compete against each other to trade shares, own 
GASCI.   Since the official launching not many Guyanese firms have signed on, partly 
because family businesses are unwilling to divulge certain information and they are also 
afraid to lose controlling stake. 
 The monetary policy framework 
As was explained above, a key component of the reform agenda was the adoption 
of indirect monetary policy instruments. The indirect or market-based monetary policy 
focuses on the reserve position of the banking system since excess reserves are assumed 
to engender changes in bank credit.  The operating framework is the reserve money 
programme (RMP) that is itself rooted in the IMF’s financial programming model (see 
Khemraj 2007).  The RMP takes into consideration the fact that commercial bank 
reserves provide the link between the balance sheet of the central bank and that of the 
consolidated commercial banking system.  Given this linkage, therefore, the central bank 
can influence the quantity of bank reserves by varying the stock of government securities 
it holds when it conducts open market operations or when it intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market.  Unlike direct monetary policy that places restrictions on commercial 
banks’ balance sheet; market-based monetary policy seeks to operate on the reserve 
position of the banking system.  It is assumed that an excess of non-remunerative excess 
reserves will encourage banks to lend more or intensify investments in foreign assets; a 
shortage, in contrast, will cause banks to curtail lending and hold fewer foreign assets.   
 13
The RMP is akin to a monetary targeting framework in which the central bank 
tries to obtain an optimal target for reserve money (or base money) that is consistent with 
the macroeconomic objectives.  Firstly, the central bank defines the ultimate 
macroeconomic objectives which are output growth, inflation and import cover.  
Secondly, broad money growth (or growth of M2) – which is the intermediate target – is 
then projected to be consistent with the macroeconomic objectives bearing in mind the 
assumption for velocity.  And thirdly, the growth of reserve money (or base money) is 
then projected to be in line with that of broad money that is itself dependent on the 
targeted macroeconomic objectives.  The programme is based on three important 
assumptions: (i) the reserve position of banks determine their ability to extend credit to 
the economy; (ii) the money multiplier is stable or at least predictable; and (iii) the 
balance of payment is a monetary phenomenon (meaning the excess of money supply 
over desired money balances will lead to a deterioration of the current account). 
The factors that affect the supply of reserve money can be divided into two 
categories: (i) autonomous or non-discretionary factors that are not under the control of 
the central bank; and (ii) policy factors driven by the discretionary actions of the 
monetary authority, example changes in reserve requirements or open market operations.  
The monetary policy stance is determined by the gap between actual reserve money and 
the desired or forecasted level.  Monetary policy is tightened if actual reserve money is 
above the desired level; and it is eased when actual reserve money is below the desired 
amount; there is a neutral stance when the desired amount is equal to the actual amount.  
Guyana’s case is peculiar because the system always finds itself with a reserve surplus; 
hence the monetary authority is continually anxious – because excess reserves are seen as 
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a potential determinant of domestic prices – to mop up the excess by selling Treasury 
bills.  The central bank, therefore, persistently tries to transform excess reserves into 
secondary reserves or excess liquid assets.   
5. THE BROKEN NEXUS 
This section provides some important stylized facts regarding the behaviour of the 
aggregate commercial banking sector.  Figure 2 plots the aggregate level of non-
remunerative excess reserves against the average loan rate.  The reason for doing this is 
to extract the aggregate banking sector’s liquidity preference curve (or excess liquidity 
demand curve) vis-à-vis the loan interest rate.  The liquidity preference curve is fitted 
using a technique known as locally weighted regressions (LOESS)4.  Figure 2 shows a 
fitted liquidity preference that is steep at high interest rates and then becomes flat (or 
perfectly elastic) as the loan rate falls.  The curve tends to become horizontal at 
approximately sixteen percent, implying that banks view non-remunerative excess 
reserves and interest paying loans to private agents as perfect substitutes at this rate 
which is substantially above zero.     
This article proposes that the flat curve at a high threshold rate signifies a mark-up 
loan rate.  Khemraj (2010) derived the mark-up rate above the marginal transaction costs 
(prevalent in the loan market), a borrower-specific risk premium, and a suitable foreign 
interest rate.  The foreign interest rate is important (because of arbitrage arguments) 
within the context of financial globalization, which enables the banks to hold any 
                                                 
4 This technique is explained by Cleveland (1993).  The term local regression is used because only a subset 
of observations within a neighbourhood is utilized continually to fit the curve.  The regression is weighted 
so that observations further from the given data point are given less weight. The subset of data used in each 
weighted least squares fit is comprised of αN, where α = the smoothing parameter and N = number of data 
points.   A higher parameter, α, gives a smoother fit, but the fitted curve is less “local”.  This paper uses a 
smoothing parameter of 0.3.   
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quantity of foreign assets.  The latter would imply that non-remunerated excess reserves 
should be zero as they would always try to substitute foreign assets for non-remunerated 
excess reserves.  However, banks are still likely to hold excess reserves because the 
central bank creates a foreign currency constraint by buying up foreign currency in the 
local foreign exchange market.  The central bank, in turn, compensates the commercial 
banks by selling them government Treasury bills as it tries to mop up the injected 
liquidity from previous interventions in the foreign exchange market.          
 
Figure 2. Excess reserves and the average loan rate (Quarterly data: 1988Q1 – 2006:Q4)   
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An obvious question would be what other investments banks make after they 
curtail credit to the private sector.  Figure 3 suggests an answer to that question5.  On the 
vertical axis is the change in the level of foreign assets (foreign assets comprise mainly of 
                                                 
5 The information presented in figures 4, 5 and 6 were published in another article written by this author 
(see Khemraj 2009).   
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deposits in foreign counterpart banks), while on the horizontal axis is the quantity of US 
dollars purchased minus the quantity sold by the commercial banking system as a whole.  
A negative value would mean the banks have a shortage of US dollars, while a positive 
value indicates a surplus of US dollars.  The figure shows a positive relationship, which 
says a surplus value of US dollars is associated with a flight into foreign assets, while a 
deficit is associated with a decrease in the quantity of foreign assets.   
 
Figure 3. Foreign currency market (purchases minus sales of US$) and change in 
commercial banks foreign assets – monthly data 1999:1 to 2006:6 
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Figure 4 demonstrates that banks decrease their demand for excess reserves 
contemporaneously.  Again, the horizontal axis (figure 4) graphs the surplus or deficit of 
US dollars traded in the interbank foreign exchange market; the ratio of total reserves 
divided by required reserves is plotted on the vertical axis.  A ratio of one indicates that 
the quantity of excess reserves is zero, while a ratio above one shows a surfeit of excess 
 17
reserves in the banking system.  The fitted line demonstrates a negative relationship.  
Hence, banks decrease holdings of excess reserves when there as a surplus of US dollars.   
 To complete the picture it would be interesting to see the extent to which the 
surplus or deficit in the foreign exchange market influences the loan market.  If a deficit 
in the foreign exchange market induces the banks to make loans, it implies bank 
portfolios are responsive to liquidity changes.  If liquidity changes do not elicit much of a 
change in the loan market, then bank portfolios are static, a position that is consistent 
with the hypothesis of the minimum mark-up threshold interest rate.  Figure 5 illustrates 
an almost flat fitted line that intersects the vertical axis just below zero.  Hence, a 
shortage of US dollars does not elicit a substantial positive change in the supply of loans 
to private agents.    
Figure 4. Foreign currency market (purchases minus sales of US$) and commercial banks 
excess reserves – monthly data 1999:1 to 2006:6 
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Figure 5. Foreign currency market (purchases minus sales of US$) and change in 
commercial banks credit to private sector – monthly data 1999:1 to 2006:6 
 
 
 The analysis above suggests a consistent pattern of bank investment behaviour.  
At first banks limit lending to the private sector; we argue this is because they possess the 
market power to demand a threshold interest rate at which the aggregate excess liquidity 
curve is flat.  If the marginal borrower is unable to pay the minimum mark-up loan rate 
the banks can either accumulate excess reserves or deposit money abroad in foreign 
counterpart banks.  Moreover, the evidence suggests when commercial banks possess a 
surplus of US dollars they will prefer to hold more foreign assets instead of extending 
credit to the private sector.  Finally, this kind of investment pattern is inconsistent with 
the thesis underpinning FL.     
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 To further examine the pattern of bank lending Appendix 1 – Tables 1A and 1B – 
looks at the composition of bank assets and bank credit.  Figure 1A shows a noticeable 
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increase after the reforms in the proportion of assets held as foreign assets.  The 
percentage of reserves fell slightly but remained steady since 2001.  Credit to the private 
sector increased steadily since the reforms; however, there has been a substantial decline 
in the percentage of credit extended to the private sector since 1999.  Figure 1B shows 
the allocation of bank credit.  Two main trends are evident: (i) banks extend an increasing 
percentage of loans to households to fund consumption; and (ii) there is a steady decline 
in the percentage of credit extended to businesses since 2000.  In the Guyanese context, 
where a significant percentage of consumption goes towards imports, it is reasonable to 
say that consumption-driven loans are more likely to augment imports rather than 
facilitate economic growth.   
6. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION & OLIGOPOLISTIC BANKING   
The FL thesis depends on the existence of a competitive financial system.  
However, we have noted that the loan market in Guyana is uncompetitive.  Banks possess 
the ability to exogenously determine a threshold minimum loan rate.  This tendency can 
be illustrated by a flat (or perfectly elastic) excess reserves demand curve at an interest 
rate above zero (see fig. 2).  A humble conjecture is as follows: the threshold rate 
identifies the average system-wide mark-up rate.  In other words, it is a production-based 
interest rate which is a mark up over the marginal cost of doing business6 plus a suitable 
safe benchmark rate (that is the rate at which the bank can invest all its capital safely 
instead of making loans).  The downward sloping section of the curve represents short-
term deviations from the production-based long-term threshold interest rate.  One factor 
that drives the deviations would be tight monetary policy which shifts to the left a vertical 
liquidity supply curve along the stable bank liquidity demand curve.  It should be noted 
                                                 
6 Example, the cost of labour, electricity, building, security and so on.   
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that our long-term interest rate is analogous to Wicksell’s (1907) natural rate that is 
determined by the marginal productivity of capital.  On the other hand, the hypothesized 
interest rate here is a function of the dual – the marginal cost of banking.      
There are two issues resulting from the proposition of an oligopolistic loan 
market.  The first has to do with the effectiveness of market-based or indirect monetary 
policy.  For instance, expansionary open market operations along the threshold interest 
rate would be ineffective in altering the banking system’s portfolio allocation in favour of 
new business loans.  However, once commercial banks could obtain foreign exchange, 
they would invest the funds in foreign assets.  Should there be a binding foreign exchange 
constraint (that is a foreign currency shortage), the expansionary monetary policy would 
result in the passive accumulation of excess reserves by the banking system.  The passive 
accumulation results from two binding constraints – the threshold minimum mark-up rate 
and the foreign currency constraint.  
On the other hand, monetary policy could elicit substitution between excess 
reserves and business loans along the downward sloping segment of the excess liquidity 
demand curve.  Thus the banking sector’s asset portfolio becomes active over the 
downward sloping segment of the liquidity preference curve.  However, we should note 
that this operation of monetary policy, or stabilization policy, along a stable liquidity 
preference curve could have an adverse impact on business investments as businesses that 
are unable to pay the threshold rate of 16 percent (in the case of Guyana) would not 
obtain finance. 
This takes us to the second issue of the effect of the mark-up rate on investment 
demand in the post-liberalization era.  In an era of oligopolistic banking and mark-up 
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interest rate there is no reason to expect FL to clear the market for loanable funds.  The 
classic FL model presented by Fry (1995, p. 24) assumes interest rate de-repression 
would equilibrate desired savings and investment.  However, in a financial system where 
entry barriers predominate, a few commercial banks emerge as the dominant financial 
institutions in the entire financial system.  Consequently, the banks are in a position to 
mark up the loan rate to a level which is higher than the abstract natural interest rate 
which equilibrates desired savings and investment in a loanable funds model.  Therefore, 
the credit rate could overshoot the equilibrium rate in a post-liberalized era thereby 
causing an investment demand constraint.  That investment demand forms a critical 
binding constraint in the third world is proposed by Rodrik and Subramanian (2009); 
these authors emphasized the real exchange rate as a primary force behind the investment 
constraint.  However, this article proposes the oligopolistic mark-up interest rate as a 
primary cause of the binding constraint.  This is illustrated in figure 6.        
 
Figure 6. From financial repression to oligopoly stagnation 
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The competitive interest rate is given by and the equilibrium investment (which 
equals savings) is given at 
*r
*I .  However, interest rate de-regulation allows the mark-up 
rate to form at (which equals the marginal cost of production + a safe benchmark 
interest rate).  If the natural rate (or the competitive rate) can be achieved the rate of 
economic growth and the level of savings, respectively, would be and .  Note 
in this paper the natural rate is interpreted to be the rate which brings into equilibrium the 
real forces of savings and investment.  However, this is not likely to occur in an economy 
with an oligopolistic banking sector.  The mark-up credit rate occurs above the 
competitive rate.  This rate constrains investment to 
min
1Lr
*g * *( , )S r g
1I , while the level of savings and the 
rate of growth are restricted to  and , respectively.  There is no reason to 
expect the financial sector to facilitate a rate of growth of .  The economy could be 
jammed indefinitely in a low growth equilibrium .  Prior to interest rate de-repression, 
the government regulated interest rate would be below the natural rate at .  The role of 
financial intermediation in growth is also restricted at the repressed
min
1 1( ,LS r g )
                                                
1g
g
*g
1
Rr
Rr
7.   Therefore, the 
economy has evolved into a stage of private oligopoly bank stagnation from that of 
government-induced financial repression.  Hence, the missing link between finance and 
economic growth.              
7. CONCLUSION  
The forgoing analysis made the argument that the role of financial intermediation 
in Guyanese economic development has been impeded in the post-liberalized regime of 
 
7 See Fry (1995, 1982) for detailed explanation of the channels through which financial repression could 
retard economic growth.   
 23
oligopoly bank stagnation as it has been constrained during the era of government 
financial repression.  Therefore, the economy has evolved from a period of government-
induced financial repression to private oligopoly bank stagnation.  Moreover, the finance-
growth nexus is broken.  At the theoretical level the article argued that private profit-
maximizing commercial banks would mark up the loan rate over the marginal cost of 
business operation and a risk-free interest rate.  Furthermore, the banks are likely to set 
the mark-up rate above the competitive natural rate, whereas in the regime of financial 
repression government controls the rate below the equilibrium natural rate.  The result 
with respect to economic growth is the same – stagnation and a dubious contribution of 
finance to economic growth. 
 A tempting policy conclusion would be to encourage more competition in the 
financial system.  But that is not a straightforward solution.  The reason being there are 
natural entry barriers that necessitate an oligopolistic banking sector.  The size of the real 
economy does not allow for a very competitive banking system and the preponderance of 
entry barriers do not make the sector very contestable.  In other words, the size of the 
financial sector is constrained by the size of the real production sector.  The conventional 
view that gave birth to financial liberalization takes it for granted that deregulation, new 
and esoteric financial instruments, and privatized financial institutions would result in 
efficient intermediation and growth.  This article is sceptical with respect to this view 
because Guyana’s problem is not finance; rather it is the problem of an adverse 
production structure that drives low quality economic growth.  The economy is 
dependent on primary resource extraction and low productivity manufacturing like sugar, 
which place Guyana in a low position in the global production hierarchy.  In addition, 
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Guyana specializes in diminishing returns production activities with little or no scope for 
new technology adaptation and learning. Thus given its current production structure, the 
country specializes in being poor (see Reinert 2007 for an outline of this argument vis-à-
vis global economic development) and therefore it will stay poor.   
Therefore, liberal financial policies alone cannot propel Guyana out of its current 
adverse production structure and low quality growth trap.  Liberal financial policies 
would have to be accompanied by an active industrial policy framework.  The essence of 
any industrial policy framework should take into consideration the arguments and advice 
given by Chang (2006) and Rodrik (2007).  Without active industrial policy the economy 
could stagnate indefinitely in a post-liberalized economy.  On the other hand, when the 
economy does achieve noticeable positive growth it would be of low quality driven by 
inherently diminishing returns production activities such as sugar, rice and mineral 
extraction.   
Once there is production transformation in the real economy finance would 
follow.  However, this does not imply finance is unimportant although it is subservient to 
real sector production.  Finance is very important in a growing economy, although it does 
not spark the growth.  Moreover, market-based monetary policy – another cornerstone of 
financial liberalization – would tend to operate along a stable but high bank liquidity 
preference curve with a high flat interest threshold.  Thus monetary expansion along the 
flat threshold interest rate would tend not lead to a favourable real effect; however, 
monetary contraction along the high downward sloping liquidity preference curve would 
tend to engender business credit contraction.  However, market-based monetary policy 
could become relatively more effective in the long-term if a well designed industrial 
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policy framework could augment economy-wide productivity gains, which diminish the 
marginal cost of banking and thus facilitate a more expansionary role for monetary policy 
by shifting downward the entire liquidity preference curve.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 1A, Composition of commercial bank assets 
 
Total 
Assets 
(G$ mill) Reserves
Foreign
Assets
Credit to
government
Credit to 
public 
enterprises
Credit to
private sector 
1980 834 15.1 7.1 27.1 27.5 23.3 
1985 2851 22.0 1.2 29.1 29.4 18.2 
1990 13233 13.6 18.2 31.1 5.7 31.4 
1995 50598 20.4 7.5 31.4 0.8 39.9 
1996 68530 15.7 5.5 25.2 0.4 53.3 
1997 80043 16.6 4.4 22.5 0.3 56.2 
1998 88744 18.1 4.4 17.9 0.5 59.2 
1999 90130 13.8 8.0 14.8 0.8 62.6 
2000 102396 15.1 7.0 19.8 0.4 57.7 
2001 108152 17.0 8.1 19.2 0.8 54.9 
5 0.8 
4 0.4 
2002 117819 17.9 10.3 20.3 0.8
2003 122471 17.9 14.7 26.3 0.7
2004 133400 17.5 16.3 28.6 0.9 36.7 
2005 150180 17.7 18.8 26.9 1.0 35.6 
              (3) Credit to government include mainly holdings of Treasury bills
Percent of total
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Author's calculation. 
Notes:    (1) Credit to government includes Treasury bill holdings and loans.
              (2) Reserves include required and excess amounts.
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Table 1B, Composition of commercial bank credit 
 
 
Total 
Loans
(G$ mill) 
Loans to 
government 
sector 
Loans to 
private 
businesses
Loans to
households
Loans to 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions
Loans to non-
residents 
1980 423 55.2 28.7 15.5 0.5 0.1 
1985 1411 60.1 27.0 12.4 0.2 0.2 
1990 4914 16.1 68.5 15.1 0.0 0.3 
1995 22190 2.2 68.9 24.2 0.3 4.4 
1996 37162 0.8 80.2 16.3 0.5 2.2 
1997 44540 0.5 76.7 19.7 0.3 2.9 
1998 50048 0.8 77.8 19.9 0.4 1.1 
1999 53885 1.4 77.4 19.4 1.1 0.8 
2000 54660 0.8 79.8 16.8 1.2 1.4 
2001 52433 1.6 78.3 16.7 0.9 2.5 
2002 50474 1.6 75.9 18.0 1.4 3.1 
2003 41739 2.1 71.1 21.1 2.0 3.5 
2004 38137 3.4 69.7 21.5 1.3 4.1 
2005 40337 3.9 65.7 25.5 1.3 3.5 
Note: commercial bank credit excludes holdings of government Treasury bills
Source: Bank of Guyana Statistical Bulletin; author's calculation. 
Percent of total
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